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Abstract
We compare the national allocation plans (NAPs), proposed and submitted by EU Member States as of October
2006, with our estimations for CO2 emissions by the installations covered by these NAPs. The collective allocations
proposed under phase II NAPs exceed the historic trend of emissions extrapolated forward. Using our projections
we find, depending on uncertainty in fuel prices, economic growth rates, performance of the non-power sector and
CDM/JI availability, a 15% chance of a ‘dead market’ with emissions below cap even at zero prices. With an
expected inflow of committed CDM/JI credits of 100 MtCO2/year, allowance supply will exceed demand in 50%
of cases without any carbon price, and in 80% of our €20/tCO2 scenarios. Banking of allowances towards post-
2012 conditions could create additional demand, but this is difficult to anticipate and conditional on policy
evolution. The proposed phase II NAPs would result in low prices and only small volumes of CDM/JI would enter
the EU ETS. CDM/JI would almost exclusively be public-sector funded, placing the cost of Kyoto compliance
entirely upon governments.
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1. Introduction
This article projects the balance of supply and demand of allowances to emit CO2 under the European
emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) for the period 2008–2012. This balance will determine the
scarcity, and hence the allowance price, during this period. Our aim is therefore to assess the
collective implications of the proposed plans for the operation of the EU ETS in phase II.
Installations covered by the scheme have to provide CO2 allowances for every tonne of CO2
they emit. This forms the demand for allowances under the scheme. The supply to the market
follows from tradable allowances allocated to existing or new installations or auctioned by
governments as defined in the national allocation plans. The linking directive allows for some
additional allowance supply to the EU-ETS market from project credits under the clean development
mechanism (CDM) or joint implementation (JI) projects. To the extent that allowances from the
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period 2008–2012 are banked to future periods, this would create additional demand. It seems
rather certain that no allowances from the period post-2012 can be borrowed to cover emissions in
the period 2008–2012, so no additional supply from banking is expected.
In light of the NAPs that have been proposed by Member States for the second phase, this article
aims to assess their aggregate impact on the market. We first collated the information in each plan –
itself a complex exercise given some of the special provisions. Then we made different projections
for the possible inflow of allowances from the CDM and JI project mechanisms. We start by
comparing allocation against extrapolation of past trends. The main contribution of the article is a
projection of the CO2 emissions from installations covered by the European emission trading
scheme. With the models we explore the implications of different price and growth scenarios.
In projecting these emissions we started from the verified emission data from the year 2005. For
the non-power sectors we used two different modelling approaches to project the anticipated
emissions in the period 2008–2012 on a sectoral level for each country. In the power sector,
emissions are very sensitive to fuel and CO2 prices. Therefore we applied a detailed power sector
model developed by ICF International to project country-level emissions.
One inherent uncertainty in this field is caused by limited or restricted data availability. First,
there is still some concern about the accuracy of monitoring of CO2 allowances at the installation
level – and future changes to the monitoring guidelines could alter the aggregate monitored
emissions. Second, for three Member States, only limited information about verified emissions for
our base year 2005 was available. If aggregate emissions of installations covered by ETS in these
Member States were below our assumptions, then the gap between projected emissions and the
cap could be bigger (and vice versa). In Section 6 we provide a more detailed discussion of the
sensitivity of our modelling to various parameters and model choices.
We projected emissions and assessed the cap on a national level. We also verified our power sector
model, the assumptions on the cap and the split between sectors on the national level. However, we
did not have the resources to comprehensively compare our projections against all national projections.
2. Methodology and assumptions
To project future CO2 emissions, we treat the power sector separately from other sectors covered
by the ETS. For the power sector we examine emissions using the Integrated Planning Model
(IPM) of ICF International, which simulates every European power station and investment decisions
in new power stations. For the remaining sectors we use two approaches. First, we start from the
verified emissions from 2005, adjust for the coverage of the ETS and then apply sector-specific
growth rates from a recent DTI BAU study combined with country-specific CO2 growth rates from
OECD projections (OECD, 2006). The second approach to project emissions of the non-power
sectors involves applying country- and sector-specific CO2 growth rates as determined by the
E3ME model of Cambridge Econometrics and calibrated for the Matisse FP6 project (Matisse,
2006), assuming CO2 prices around €20/tCO2. The detailed assumptions and our treatment of
missing data are explained in Appendices 1 and 2.
To explore sensitivity to prices, we use four different fuel price assumptions from a recent UK
Department of Trade and Industry study (DTI, 2006b) (see Appendix 3).
To determine the total cap, we use the publicly available data from NAPs, assuming that all New
Entrant Reserves (NERs) will be issued. Some NAPs envisage that New Entrant Reserves will be
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cancelled if not issued to new entrants.1 Without any new build in these countries, the total EU cap
would be reduced by 20 MtCO2/year.
We furthermore take into account the potential inflow of allowances into the EU ETS from CDM
and JI projects. Following a more detailed discussion in Grubb and Neuhoff (2006), we assume a
potential range of between 0 and 1,000 MtCO2 international project credits and allowances to
enter the ETS during the period 2008–2012. The upper level is one-third lower than the total
projected availability of CDM and JI for Europe, assuming that at least some of the inflow would
be taken by government inflow in all cases; it is also roughly consistent with the ‘supplementarity’
constraint that many Member States have built into their plans in line with Kyoto commitments,
representing, even at this maximum level, an inflow of less than 10% of allocated allowances.
Indeed the EU Commission insisted in their decision on the first 10 second-phase NAPs (Nov
2006) that some Member States tighten their supplementary condition. Table 1 gives the range that
we assume for cap and inflow (Appendix 4).
3. Emission projections in relation to historic trends
To verify our emission projections, we first compared them to historic emissions from 1990–2004
using data from the European Community GHG Inventory (EEA, 2006) as shown in Figures 1 and 2.
CAP 2074
CAP with NER 2178
CAP with NER, high CDM/JI inflow 2378
Figure 1. Linear trend of ETS emissions compared to simulation results for the case
of zero CO2 price and central fuel price assumptions.
Table 1. Our estimations of CAP including inflows from
JI and CDM projects (MtCO2/year)
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As the Inventory only provides data on the total national greenhouse gas emissions, we follow
Georgopoulou et al. (2006) and assume that the share of emissions associated with ETS sectors
stays constant. Fitting a linear trend to this historic emission from 1990–2004 (later start for
accession countries), we then extrapolated the BAU development of emissions for 2005–2012
(Appendix 5).
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that the emissions under this linear trend are lower than projected in
the two central fuel price scenarios as defined by the UK Department of Industry (DTI, 2006a).
The most likely reason for this, despite a decade of decline or stability, is that the model assumes
a slowdown in the rate of energy efficiency improvements and a slowdown in the historic shift
from coal towards natural gas, in the light of higher natural gas prices. We do, however, note a
general tendency that models have previously projected emissions growth that has not materialized.
As our model approach is also likely to underestimate emission reductions from unanticipated
technological, institutional and behavioural changes, our results may be conservative – the excess
allocation that we estimate for NAP IIs might in practice be even higher. To set this in the context
of phase II allocations, the total phase II cap with NER implied by the proposed NAPs is slightly
above the average emissions levels over the past 10 years.
Figure 2 illustrates that with a price of €20/tCO2, emissions from the ETS sectors are projected
to be roughly stable at current levels, still slightly above the historic trend.
4. Numerical results from simulations under uncertainty
Figure 3 compares the total NAP II allocation (the horizontal line spanning 2008–2012) against
most recent emissions data (2005), the phase I cap, and a range of projections for emissions over
the period assuming €0/tCO2. We assume four different fuel price scenarios, three different economic
growth rates, and apply two different models for the non-power sector. Thus the projection range
Figure 2. Linear trend of ETS emissions compared to simulation results for the case
of a €20/tCO2 price and central fuel price assumptions.
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depicts the outcome of 24 different model scenarios. The vertical lines with T-endings show the
range of potential inflow from JI and CDM credits into ETS.
Note that the phase I cap was significantly above the 2005 verified emissions, and the NAP II
allocations in turn represent a significant increase over phase I. This suggests that Member States
did not take on board the experience from the observed crash in CO2 prices in May 2006 when
proposing their NAPs for phase II.
Our model estimates of emissions for 2006 exceed the 2005 verified emissions, for four reasons.
First, in the electricity modelling we do not reflect that some gas generation is operated, despite
being more expensive than coal, because it is supplied under take-or-pay gas contracts. This would
have decreased CO2 emissions by 100 Mt. Second, the electricity model calculates aggregate CO2
emissions for the year 2006 that exceed verified emissions in 2005 by 25 Mt. We decided against
scaling the output to match the observed data, as the differences could equally be caused by slight
variations in input prices and hydro availability. Third, with GDP growth, emissions from the non-
power sector are expected to grow by 25 Mt. Fourth, 63.1 Mt of additional installations are covered
under NAP II that either opted out of NAP I or where the coverage was extended.
The range of results for 2008–2012 illustrates that emission projections are subject to considerable
uncertainty. Figure 3 shows the distribution in terms of five probability bands, with the central red
illustrating the central 20% of scenario outcomes. The results show that, even with a zero carbon
price (a ‘no EU ETS’ scenario):
– Without any inflow of CDM and JI credits, allowance supply will exceed demand in 20% of our
scenarios. In other words, based on the proposed NAPs for the second phase and a range of
other input assumptions, there is a one-in-five risk that the EU ETS would be unable to sustain
any carbon market or incentive to abate, at home or abroad. We could only expect a positive
price if banking moves a significant share of the allowances towards the post-2012 period.
Figure 3. Projected CO2 emissions versus cap for the BAU (assuming zero CO2 price).
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– If inflows from JI and CDM projects are high (200 MtCO2/year), 80% of the projections result in
excess supply. Obviously, there is a certain paradox in a combination of high emission credit
imports with an overall surplus market, but it illustrates that current phase II allocations are
extremely unlikely to support private purchase of emission credits on the scale that suppliers
may be hoping for, even at very low carbon prices.
Figure 4 illustrates the equivalent results if the power sector adjusts investment and operational
decisions to reflect a carbon price of €20/tCO2. Obviously, this reduces the total emissions in our
24 model scenarios, as depicted.
Figure 4 shows that:
– in 50% of the scenarios assuming an allowance price of €20/tCO2, emissions would fall below
the European cap even without any inflows of JI and CDM credits into the EU ETS;
– at the high level of credit inflow, the probability of sustaining a €20/tCO2 price is very small,
and even in our central case (100 MtCO2/year), there is only a 20% chance of the market
sustaining a price of €20/tCO2.
This suggests that the currently published allocation levels of NAPs II are simply not consistent
with sustaining CO2 prices at significant levels.
The level of the CO2 emissions in this projection suggests that if the European countries want to
ensure CO2 prices close to €20/tCO2 then allocation has to be cut back significantly to reduce the
aggregated EU cap. The implication based on our projections is that if a 200 Mt tightening were
associated with a similar level of JI/CDM imports (200 Mt/year), there would then be roughly a
50% chance of the market sustaining a price of around €20/tCO2 – before taking account of
Figure 4. Projected emissions and cap, when the power sector is exposed to a price
of €20/tCO2.
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responses outside the power sector. Subsequent to the initial publication of this article, the EU
Commission has announced their decision on the first 10 NAPs. If the commission will apply the
same methodology across all Member States, then this will, according to our calculations, result in
a cut of 200 Mt/year.
5. Discussion
5.1. Implications for the NAP approval process
Comparing the projections for CO2 emissions presented in this article to the proposed NAPs (before
the Commission’s decision), we concluded that they are unlikely to support a viable CO2 market.
These conclusions are consistent with those of Betz et al. (2006, this issue) and put a spotlight on
the European Commission’s NAP approval process. The Commission has to evaluate each NAP on
its own merits, in relation to the criteria laid out in the Directive. Nevertheless, given the relative
ambition of some of the NAPs (e.g. Spain, Italy, the UK) our collective result must imply that
many other NAPs contain over-allocation based on emission projections which, at least when
considered collectively, are implausible. This would contravene the relevant terms of the Directive.
A further basis on which the Commission might critically assess the national allocation plans
are State Aid considerations. Johnston (2006) argues that free allowance allocation does constitute
State Aid, which has to be notified according to the Directive. One relevant provision for the
assessment of such State Aid could be the proportionality principle – the benefits from the free
allocation should be proportional to the transition costs for companies from the introduction of
emission trading.
Moreover, the weak allocations raise questions about the consistency of plans with national
Kyoto targets, which is another criterion relevant to Commission assessment. In principle, countries
could ‘fill the gap’ with purchases of JI/CDM, to which we now turn.
5.2. Implications for CDM/JI credits and government purchase
Weak allocations in the EU ETS do not necessarily imply a weak market for CDM/JI credits. As
long as countries comply with Kyoto, the total demand for CDM/JI (or equivalent transfers of
AAUs under Green Investment Schemes – an option not open to ETS private-sector participants)
is set by the difference between national emissions and Kyoto targets over the period 2008–2012.
The real implication of weak EU ETS allocations is on the cost of compliance to governments,
specifically finance ministries and taxpayers, through three factors:
– Substitution: more allocations to ETS sectors mean that the private sector will have less need to
purchase CDM/JI credits that would contribute to national compliance; governments must pay
for these directly.
– Increased total need: a weak EU ETS price means that EU ETS sectors undertake less abatement,
resulting in higher national emissions, and in aggregate a greater total need for CDM/JI credits.
National governments could also decide to acquire additional credits (AAUs) from countries
such as Russia and the Ukraine.
– Price escalation: the greater aggregate demand for CDM/JI credits might reasonably be assumed
to have some impact on the overall CDM/JI market, increasing the price.
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In short, the excessive allocations under the proposed national allocation plans mean that
governments have to take up the slack, and substitute for less domestic abatement by funding
additional abatement abroad at a higher unit cost to the taxpayer. This would imply that the Kyoto
credits market will become a largely public-sector funded operation, rather than leveraging the
private investment that many had originally envisaged.
The excessive EU ETS allocation would thus conflict with a desirable emissions pathway. It is
also inconsistent with the principle that ETS sectors’ share of the national emission budget should
decline given large mitigation potentials, especially in the power sector.
5.3. Implications for auctioning and other mechanisms
This article has argued that the continuation of the EU ETS as an effective market during the
Kyoto period requires that the currently proposed volume of total free allocations is reduced,
probably by a couple of hundred MtCO2 per year. However, our analysis has emphasized the high
levels of uncertainty prevalent in emission projections. This suggests that Member States should
consider carefully measures to increase price stability and thus improve investment certainty.
One option would be the increased use of auctions. Auctions in themselves could, in principle,
provide a source of revenue for government purchases of Kyoto credits. In addition, if all Member
States were to auction allowances within the 10% limit of the Directive (200 Mt/year) and the
auctions were implemented with a price floor, then this would cover the range of uncertainty in the
projections (Hepburn et al., 2006). This could ensure that, in the case of low emissions, a reduced
inflow from the auctions would maintain prices, without distorting the demand/supply balance in
the case of higher demand.
Banking of allowances to the period post-2012 could also help to support the price, if participants
believe that the future allowance price will be higher. Banking has worked effectively in SO2 and
NOX programmes in the USA (Ellerman, 2006). However, the same mechanism in the EU ETS
would be subject to a high degree of uncertainty due to its iterative allocation approach and the
complexity of post-2012 negotiations. These added uncertainties could subject the EU ETS to
greater price volatility, and may thus reduce the effectiveness of banking as a mechanism to reduce
investment risk.2
6. Caveats and sensitivities
It is important to note that this study does not calculate the impact of CO2 prices on the CO2
emissions of the non-power sector. It relies on (a) a DTI study (DTI/OEF, 2006), which assumes
CO2 emissions under a zero CO2 price and then gives aggregate figures on the price response of
the covered sector to allowance prices, and (b) the E3ME study (Matisse, 2006), which assumes a
positive allowance price (increasing from €18 to €25/tCO2 during phase II). Using data from the
E3ME study, our emission projections for the non-power ETS sectors decrease by 75 Mt relative to
our simulations based on DTI data. As both approaches differ in various dimensions, it is not clear
to what extent this difference can be attributed to the emission reductions or are due to CO2 prices.
Therefore we did not differentiate between the two approaches, and depicted the results both for
the €0 and €20/tCO2 case as a component of the prediction uncertainty.
Table 2 illustrates how different assumptions affect the projected CO2 emissions from the EU
ETS sectors. As a basis for Figures 3 and 4 we calculated the impact of combining all these scenarios.
CP_Vol 6_4_Neuhoff_Emission_00-00.pmd 3/12/2007, 8:29 PM 402Emission projections 2008–2012 versus national allocation plans II     403
© 2006 Earthscan Climate Policy 6 (2006) 395–410
7. Conclusions
We compared the volumes of EUA supply proposed in the NAPs to a range of emission projections
to assess whether there will be scarcity and a thus a viable emissions trading market. For this
purpose, we combined a detailed power sector model for all European countries with two approaches
to project emissions of the non-power emissions covered by ETS, and simulated CO2 emissions
until 2012. We used the data from currently available national allocation plans and extrapolated to
the outstanding plans to determine the currently envisaged emission cap under ETS for the period
2008–2012. We also made assumptions about the possible inflows of JI and CDM project credits
into the ETS.
The results suggest that it is possible that emissions will be lower than the volume of issued
allowances in the scheme in a scenario where we assumed zero CO2 prices and it is very likely that
emissions will fall short of allowances in the scheme in a scenario with €20 t/CO2. Thus, very low
CO2 prices are likely to result from the currently proposed second-phase NAPs. In the current
arrangement only extensive banking into the period post-2012 could ensure a significant positive
CO2 price. However, given the uncertainty about post-2012 arrangements, such banking is unlikely
to attribute very high values to allowances, and given the complexity of political negotiations,
such banking is likely to introduce large volatilities in the prices of ETS allowances throughout the
period 2008–2012. Hence the future of EU ETS risks being heavily undermined by second-phase
NAPs submitted to the European Commission, unless decisions are made to amend proposals in
line with a tighter overall volume of allowance allocation. Since the initial publication of the study,
the Commission has decided on the first 10 national allocation plans, and has requested that nine
countries reduce the total volume of allocated allowances. The range of CO2 emissions simulated
for the year 2008–2012 illustrates how sensitive emissions can be to changing GDP growth rates,
fuel prices and to energy intensity and technology development in all sectors. To increase the
predictability of CO2 prices in the light of this uncertainty, one might consider using the flexibility
of the EU Directive and lessen free allocation to sectors that are not exposed to competition outside
of the EU (e.g. the power sector). The allowances not issued for free could then be auctioned, e.g.
10% of the allowances issued per country. If a harmonized European price floor were to be used in
these auctions, then this could help to manage the volatility inherent in any system in which
cutbacks are modest compared with the intrinsic uncertainties in emission trends, and create
confidence that the price will not drop below the price floor. This would facilitate investment in
low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency.
Table 2. Sensitivity of projected CO2 emissions to model parameters
Zero CO2 price €20/tCO2
(Average 2008–2012) MtCO2/year Change MtCO2/year Change
Central fuel price favouring gas, DTI 2352 2218
Matisse study with E3ME for non power 2277 –3.2% 2143 –3.4%
Fuel price scenario, central favouring coal 2416 2.7% 2289 3.2%
Fuel price scenario, low fuel price 2316 –1.5% 2160 –2.6%
Fuel price scenario, high fuel price 2444 3.9% 2407 8.5%
GDP growth 0.75% higher/a (= CO2 growth) 2424 3.1% 2286 3.0%
GDP growth 0.75% lower/a (= CO2 growth) 2282 –3.0% 2152 –3.0%
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Notes
1 The NAPs specify that Cyprus, Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta and Portugal should not sell the excess NER back to the
market. In the French NAP it has not been decided whether to cancel the excess NER or auction it, but for the purpose of
calculating the maximum possible reduction of the cap, we assume that it will be cancelled.
2 Note also that, in the longer term, governments could issue option contracts for CO2, also ensuring a price floor (Ismer and
Neuhoff, 2006). European governments could thus guarantee buying back allowances until the scarcity of allowances is
increased to the strike price of the option contracts.
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Appendix 1: Verified emissions
We started with verified emission data (EU Commission, 2006a, 27 September 2006) differentiated
into iron and steel, cement, lime, glass, pulp and paper, ceramics, others, and primary aluminium.
Based on WIFO (2006), we separated the classification combustion installations into power- and
non-power-related combustion installations. Since we could not allocate the non-power combustion
installations to specific sectors, we included them in the category ‘others’.
For Poland, data on only 331 installations were available as of 27 September 2006, representing
allocated allowances for 115.2 MtCO2 out of a total NAP I of 239.1 MtCO2. We assumed that the
installations not reported in the CITL will have the same ratio to allocated emissions as the installations
for which already reported data are available. Thus we assumed 189.0 MtCO2 emissions for Polish
installations covered by ETS in 2005 (implying a total national surplus of 50.1 MtCO2). In our
simulations of the European power sector, we calculated 132 MtCO2 emissions for Polish power
installations covered by ETS, and used this figure to separate between power- and non-power-
related emissions.
For Cyprus and Malta no data were available and we assumed that they had the same ratio
between verified emissions and NAP I allocation as the Member States for which full data were
available. We did not have data available that allowed us to differentiate between power and non-
power installations and thus applied a general emission growth trend to all emissions.
We added to these verified emissions the volume of new installations covered under NAP II that
either opted out or were not covered under NAP I (5.3 MtCO2 in Belgium, 11 Mt in Germany, 32
Mt in the UK, 6.6 MtCO2 in the Netherlands, 5.5 in France, 0.7 in Portugal, 2 in Sweden).
Appendix 2: Projections for the non-power sector
To project the CO2 emissions for the non-power sector, we first used an approach based on a
recent DTI study (DTI, 2006a, 2000b) and then an approach based on a European model developed
by Cambridge Econometrics.
For the first approach, we applied to the verified emissions per sector and country the sector-
specific emission growth rates used by the UK DTI (DTI, 2006a; DTI/OEF, 2006), scaled by the
differences in the expected national growth rates (Table 3). For example, the Spanish GDP is
expected to grow 0.6% faster in 2006 than the UK GDP; thus we also assumed that emissions
across the sectors increase 0.6% faster in Spain than in the UK. GDP growth projections for the
period 2006–2007 are based on Eurostat (2006) and for the period 2008–2012 are based on
OECD (2006) and IMF (2006).
CP_Vol 6_4_Neuhoff_Emission_00-00.pmd 3/12/2007, 8:29 PM 405406     Karsten Neuhoff et al.
Climate Policy 6 (2006) 395–410 © 2006 Earthscan
The application of the DTI model outside of the UK makes the implicit assumption that the
technological mix within a sector is roughly comparable across Europe. This is certainly a bold
assumption, but we have no data available that allow us to assess what type of bias it introduces.
By correcting for the relative size of different sectors, we intend to address the main concern of
any such transfer – a different sectoral composition between countries.
The second approach uses sector- and country-specific growth rates computed from Cambridge
Econometrics modelling. They represent those of the baseline scenario for the FP6 project Matisse
using the E3ME model, covering the 2005–2010 period (Matisse, 2006). For the purposes of this
article, we assume that the sector-specific growth rates are constant in 2011 and 2012. As the
definitions of sectors under E3ME did not exactly match the classifications of verified emissions,
we matched these sectors as described in Table 4.
Table 3. Assumed GDP growth rates
2006 2007 2008–2012
AT 2.5% 2.2% 2.4%
BE 2.3% 2.1% 1.9%
CY 3.8% 3.8% 2.8%
CZ 5.3% 4.7% 3.8%
DE 1.7% 1.0% 2.0%
DK 3.2% 2.3% 1.1%
EE 8.9% 7.9% 4.6%
ES 3.1% 2.8% 2.5%
FI 3.6% 2.9% 1.5%
FR 1.9% 2.0% 2.1%
GR 3.5% 3.4% 3.1%
HU 4.6% 4.2% 3.0%
IE 4.9% 5.1% 3.6%
IT 1.3% 1.2% 1.4%
LT 6.5% 6.2% 4.6%
LU 4.4% 4.5% 4.0%
LV 8.5% 7.6% 4.6%
MT 1.7% 1.9% 4.6%
NL 2.6% 2.6% 2.1%
PL 4.5% 4.6% 4.5%
PT 0.9% 1.1% 2.0%
SE 3.4% 3.0% 1.8%
SI 4.3% 4.1% 4.6%
SK 6.1% 6.5% 5.5%
UK 2.4% 2.8% 2.5%
Sources: 2006–2007 data from Eurostat (2006)
2008–2012 data from OECD (2006), except for CY, EE, LT, LV, MT and SI
(IMF, 2006).
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Appendix 3: Projections for the power sector
For our analysis of the European power sector, we use the Integrated Planning Model (IPM) developed
by ICF International. The IPM is a linear programming model that selects generating and investment
options to meet overall electricity demand today and on an ongoing and forward-looking basis
over the chosen planning horizon at minimum cost. Further details about the model are available
from the EPA website (http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/epa-ipm/).
Table 5 gives the fuel price assumptions for which we followed the July study of the Department
of Trade and Industry in the UK (DTI, 2006b). These prices were also applied to other European
countries, correcting for location/transport costs and adjusting the differing intra annual price
profile for gas between the UK and continental Europe. Demand projections are based on the
UCTE forecasts for all Member States except the UK (based on DTI projections).
We assumed that the EU renewables target is satisfied. The model calculates the emissions for
all power stations. For one central fuel price scenario, we determined the volume of emissions that
results from installations with less than 20 MW thermal capacity (56.4 MtCO2/year). As these
Table 5. Fossil fuel price assumptions from DTI (2006b)
Central – Favouring GAS Central – Favouring COAL
Oil ($/bbl) Gas (p/therm) Coal (£/t) Oil ($/bbl) Gas (p/therm) Coal (£/t)
2005 55 41 33.6 55 41 33.6
2010 40 25.8 27.2 40 33.5 27.2
2015 42.5 27.3 26.1 42.5 35 26.1
2020 45 28.8 25 45 36.5 25
High prices Low prices
Oil ($/bbl) Gas (p/therm) Coal (£/t) Oil ($/bbl) Gas (p/therm) Coal (£/t)
2005 55 41 33.6 55 41 33.6
2010 67 49.9 36.5 20 18 19
2015 69.5 51.4 36.5 20   9.5 16.8
2020 72 53 36.5 20 21 14.6
CITL Matisse/E3ME
Refineries   2 – Other energy own use and transformation
Cement and lime   6 – Non metallic NES
Ceramics   6 – Non metallic NES
Glass   6 – Non metallic NES
Pulp and paper  10 – Pulp and paper
Iron and steel   3 – Iron and steel
Other  12 – Other industry
Note: NES = not elsewhere specified.
Table 4. Mapping of E3ME model results to classification used for verified
emissions
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installations are mainly heat-driven, we assumed the emissions to stay constant across the time
frame considered and across fuel price scenarios.
For the simulations, we constrained new-build CCGT and coal plants to those already commissioned
until 2013. The only plants coming on before 2013 are firm builds, unplanned CT units and unplanned
wind installations (this reflects the idea that for a CCGT or coal plant to become operational by 2012
it will already have to be commissioned today). This might understate the potential for emissions
reductions from a more rapid shift to gas through additional investment in gas generation. However,
given that we already observe an increase in gas demand for power generation in Europe in the low
fuel price scenario with ETS price (from 6,700 TBtu to 11,300 TBtu coverage exceeding ETS), it is
reasonable to assume caution with additional shifts to gas generation.
Table 6 presents the aggregate CO2 emissions for European emissions, using the DTI-based
projection on emissions from the non-power sector.
When comparing the model results in 2006 with the 2005 verified power sector emissions, we
observed that we exceeded these emissions. This is what we expected, as many gas power stations
have long-term take-or-pay contracts and were thus operating despite the high 2005 gas prices. To
test our model, we implemented a minimum run requirement on gas. On a country-by-country
basis, the same amount of gas had to be used in the power sector in the 2006 as observed in 2003.
Using this constraint, our 2006 simulated data for all countries excluding Poland, Malta and Cyprus
exceeded the verified emissions data for the power sector of these countries by only 2%. Most
deviations on a per-country basis could be explained by the specific climatic conditions in the
year 2005. Therefore we were content to use the model for emission projections.
For our long-term projections, we did not apply the minimum gas consumption constraint. We assume
that the take-or-pay contracts for gas that we reflected in this constraint will be resolved as part of the
European liberalization or that new gas-powered stations will be exposed to the market price for gas.
Appendix 4: NAPs II
We used information on the second-phase cap from the national allocation plans submitted to the
EU Commission (2006b), and from the NAP II drafts published for public debate by those countries
that had not officially approved them yet, as they represent the most up-to-date data available.
Table 6. EU emission projections for power sector using IPM model (MtCO2) and based on DTI sector
projections for non-power sector
CO2 price Fossil-fuel price scenario 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Central – Fav GAS 2268 2299 2351 2322 2301 2363 2423
€0/tCO2
Central – Fav COAL 2268 2303 2361 2373 2392 2448 2505
High Prices 2268 2301 2355 2389 2433 2493 2549
Low Prices 2269 2302 2352 2286 2240 2314 2388
Central – Fav GAS 2228 2269 2255 2177 2149 2220 2289
€20/tCO2
Central – Fav COAL 2239 2283 2299 2251 2236 2298 2362
High Prices 2251 2290 2325 2342 2394 2459 2515
Low Prices 2225 2263 2216 2140 2064 2147 2232
€20/tCO2
Central – Fav gas, 2128
minimum gas constraint
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As the NAPs for DK and HU have not been published (as of 24 September 2006) we assumed
the same ratio between their cap 2005–2007 and 2008–2012 as applicable to the average of the
other Member States.
We included the entire New Entrant Reserve in the cap and also included the emissions that are
currently envisaged for auctions (7% UK, 0.29% Belgium, 3.9 MtCO2 Netherlands, 2.6 MtCO2
Poland, 0.48 MtCO2 Lithuania, 0.11 MtCO2 Ireland, 0.4 MtCO2 Austria, 0.19 MtCO2 Luxembourg).
We assume that total available CDM and JI credits for the period 2008–2012 are between
800 and 2,200 MtCO2, while Japanese demand could range between 250 and 1,000 MtCO2 (Grubb
and Neuhoff, 2006). Very high availability is unlikely to coincide with very low Japanese demand
and vice versa. We also have to allow for demand from governments to cover excess emissions in
the non-covered sector. Thus we assume that inflows into ETS in the period 2008–2012 could
range between 0 and 1,000 MtCO2. Table 1 summarizes our assumptions about the cap.
Appendix 5: Historical emissions and linear trends
We used data on the total per-country greenhouse gas emissions for the period 1990–2004 from
the annual European Community GHG Inventory (EEA, 2006).
Projections for 2005–2012 have been obtained by linear regression of the available sample of
total GHG emissions for each country. The initial analysis on a country-by-country basis pointed
to the well-known strong decline in emissions in accession countries during their early
transformation in the 1990s, and therefore we subsequently excluded data for the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia for the years until 1992, 1993, 1992, 1998,
1995 and 1993 for the estimation of the linear trend.
We then used data on the ETS share of CO2 emissions relative to the total GHG emissions from
Georgopoulou et al. (2006) based on 2003 data, and thus were able to derive the linear trend for
EU ETS BaU emissions projections.
By adopting this procedure the implicit assumption was made that the proportion of greenhouse
gases from ‘trading’ and ‘non-trading’ sectors would remain unchanged. As emissions from some
of the non-trading sectors, such as transport, are in fact expected to increase significantly, it is
likely that our approach overstates the extrapolated CO2 emissions of the covered sector. This
indicates that our estimations of CO2 emission reductions in the covered sector are conservative
and might potentially be higher, e.g. even more stringent caps would be required to ensure a
strong CO2 price.
Appendix 6: CITL classifications
An analysis of the CITL raw data performed by Entec highlighted the existence of ‘some
fundamental errors with regard to classification in the EC database of sites by sector/activity’,
although the cause is ‘not yet known’ (Entec, 2006, p. 4). Some of the problems of misclassification
are addressed in our projections:
– An analysis of the CITL classification compared to that of NAP I for Spain, Italy and the UK
illustrates some differences, which are, however, not persistent across countries and sectors. For
Italy, the discrepancy is minimal (with the maximum around 2%), while although it is more
relevant for the UK and Spain, it is not in the same sectors. Therefore, on aggregate, they might
to some extent average out.
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– Thanks to more accurate aggregate country data for the power sector (including CHP) provided
by WIFO, it has been possible to correctly distinguish non-power verified emissions from the
CITL ‘combustion’ class, thus substantially reducing the possible distortion scope to only 44%
of the total cap in terms of allocations.
– If remaining errors are in the order of 5% and imply misspecification between sectors that have
different projected CO2 growth rates of 2%, then the aggregate error (1.027 after 7 years, e.g.
15%) is 0.3%.
Appendix 7: Analysis – allocated versus verified
Based on the data available in the Community Independent Transaction Log we were able to
compare for every installation the verified emissions with the allocated allowances for the year
2005 (EU Commission, 2006a). We grouped all installations where over/under-allocation fell within
ranges of ±2.5% under/over allocation. The intervals were then labelled according to the middle
value of the interval. The remaining installations were summarized in the +100% and –100%
categories.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of total emission permits according to the extent of under/over-
allocation at the installation level as a fraction of the allocation received. The distribution is bell-
shaped with a mean higher than zero, reflecting the overall long position of the EU ETS. According
to the CITL classification, non-combustion installations, in general, received more allowances
compared to their needs than combustion installations, although the latter includes both power and
non-power sector installations, thus distorting the analysis by adding over-allocated installations
to the category.
Figure 5. Relationship between verified emissions and allowances allocated to
installations in 2005.
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